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Abstract. Information flow and non-interference are well-established techniques for expressing
both integrity and privacy properties. Because of the enormous potential to transmit information
using probabilistic methods of cryptography, interest has arisen in extending the traditional notions
of information flow to fully reactive settings that allow for reasoning about arbitrary interactive
systems, and in particular arbitrary cryptographic protocols. We propose definitions for quantifying
the amount of information that users are able to transmit to each other in such reactive settings, and
we in particular address computational restrictions and error probabilities so that our definitions
are suited for complexity-theoretic reasoning about cryptographic systems. We show that our
definitions are preserved under simulatability, which constitutes the cryptographic notion of a
secure implementation, and we link our definitions to non-interference by showing that a zero
or negligible quantity of information flow is equivalent to perfect or computational probabilistic
non-interference, respectively.
1 Introduction
Information flow and non-interference have become powerful possibilities for expressing both privacy
and integrity requirements. The concept of information flow was first investigated for secure operating
systems by Lampson [39] and subsequently by Bell and LaPadula [23] and Denning [27]. Initiated by
the work on non-interference of Goguen and Meseguer [32, 33], various definitions have subsequently
been proposed that rigorously specify when information flow is considered to occur for possibilistic and
non-deterministic systems [61, 47, 65, 51, 58, 31, 44, 46] and for probabilistic systems [34, 35, 49, 63, 60].
Whereas these lines of work concentrated on the absence of information flow in various settings, they
were accompanied by work that gave quantitative measurements of the information that might flow
between certain users, motivated by use cases where some flow of information might be inevitable or
acceptable [54, 38, 42, 24, 28].
Recently, interest has arisen in generalizing definitions of information flow so that they allow for rea-
soning about real cryptographic protocols in order to capture the variety of cryptographic techniques that
can be used to transmit information in a secret or undetectable way, e.g., encryption or steganographic
techniques. The incorporation of cryptographic reasoning into information flow definitions posed major
challenges because a faithful analysis of cryptography requires not only probabilistic behaviors but also
error probabilities and polynomial-time restrictions in terms of computational complexity. Moreover, a
suitable definition has to capture a reactive environment, i.e., continuous interaction between users, an
adversary, and the system. These problems recently led to the notion of computational probabilistic non-
interference [10, 9], itself inspired from new computational probabilistic notions for fairness and liveness
[15], which was the first definition that allowed for reasoning about information flow in a reactive setting
and the presence of cryptography. However, quantitative measurements of information flow in reactive
settings and particularly in the presence of arbitrary cryptographic protocols have not been addressed
yet.
We present the first definitions for quantifying the amount of information that one user is able to
transmit to another user within a reactive setting. We present definitions for unconditional security that
are suitable for reasoning about informational-theoretically secure or non-cryptographic systems, as well
as computational definitions that comprise complexity-theoretic reasoning such as polynomially bounded
adversaries, allow error probabilities, and are tightly related to well-established cryptographic notions
such as computational indistinguishability. Roughly, our approach to quantify an information flow from
a high user to a low user is to consider different behaviors of the high user that result in different views
of the low users (different probability distributions), to then measure the distance of these distributions,
and to finally maximize the resulting measurement for different behaviors of the high user. Both the
unconditional and the computational definitions comprise malicious or predefined behaviors of third
parties as well as timing aspects.
We show that our definitions are preserved under simulatability, which constitutes the cryptographic
notion of a secure implementation, i.e., securely implementing a specification in the sense of simulata-
bility may not increase the transmitted information in the unconditional case, and only by a negligible
quantity in the computational case. This significantly simplifies the determination of the information flow
quantity permitted within a cryptographic system, since simulatability helps to eliminate cryptography-
related details such as error probabilities and computational restrictions. Moreover, we show that a
zero or negligible quantity of information flow is equivalent to perfect and computational probabilistic
non-interference. With our simulatability preservation theorem, this in particular allows for a short,
alternative proof that non-interference properties are preserved under simulatability [10].
Further related literature. The only definitions of information flow that reside in a reactive scenario
and that allow for complexity-theoretic reasoning have been presented by Backes and Pfitzmann in [10,
9] based on the model of reactive simulatability [57, 20]; quantitative aspects of information flow are,
however, not considered there.
The work that comes closest to ours in terms of quantifying information flow is the one on approx-
imate non-interference of Di Pierro et al. [28]. They defined the notion of ε-confinement that captured
that information flow is still acceptable if the distance of views of specific user deviate only up to prob-
ability ε. Although their definition does not address computational aspects as needed for cryptographic
purposes, our work is nevertheless inspired by some of their ideas. Lowe [42] measured the amount of
information in a non-probabilistic setting by counting the number of different behaviors of the high user
that yield different views for the low user. Clark et al. [24] proposed syntax-directed inference rules for
computing estimates on information flow in an imperative language. Both works do not aim to deal with
computational aspects.
Early ideas of quantitative security based on Shannon’s information theory go back to Denning’s
work [26], which was subsequently used in [54, 38] to measure the quantity of covert channels. The
investigated settings, however, were simplistic in that the channels were memoryless, there was no input
feedback in the channel, and only uncorrelated inputs; moreover, no computational restrictions were
taken into account there. This stands in blatant contrast to reactive scenarios that allow for expressing
and analyzing arbitrary (cryptographic) primitives and protocols, where inputs and user behaviors are
typically highly correlated and protocols are highly stateful. We consider it interesting future work to
extend the information-theoretic line of work to our unconditional definitions, and we have some basic
ideas on this subject that we intend to pursue.
Recent research has also investigated non-interference properties involving real cryptographic prim-
itives, but without investigating quantitative aspects. Laud [40, 41] presented a sequential language for
which he expressed real computational secrecy. The definition is non-reactive and specific to encryp-
tion as the only cryptographic primitive. Volpano [62] investigated conditions for safely using one-way
functions in a programming language, but his underlying definition does not express non-interference,
but the secrecy of a specific secret. Abadi and Blanchet [1] introduced type systems where asymmet-
ric communication primitives, especially public-key encryption, can be handled, but these primitives
are only relative to a Dolev-Yao abstraction [29], i.e., the primitives are idealized so that no compu-
tational non-interference definition is needed. The computational soundness of Dolev-Yao abstraction
is currently still subject to intensive research, see, e.g., [56, 2, 8, 17, 7, 11, 16, 22, 19, 3, 12, 53, 14, 13, 5].
Finally, whenever new notion of non-interference are suggested, special care must be taken concerning
their composition,since obtaining security under composition is known to be a highly sophisticated task,
see e.g., [47, 37, 48, 50, 52, 45, 25, 21, 4, 18, 6, 19, 12].
Outline of the paper. In Section 2 we briefly review the underlying model of reactive simulatability, which
is an asynchronous probabilistic execution model with distributed scheduling, including computational
aspects as needed for cryptography. We give our definitions for capturing the quantity of information
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transmitted between two users in a fully reactive scenario—including the presence of cryptographic
techniques—in Section 3. In Section 4 we show that our definitions are preserved under simulatability,
and we finally show in Section 5 that a zero or negligible quantity of information flow is equivalent
to existing notions of perfect and computational probabilistic non-interference. We conclude with a
summary of our results in Section 6.
2 The Model of Reactive Simulatability
Our work is based on the model of reactive simulatability [57, 20], which is an asynchronous probabilis-
tic execution model with distributed scheduling that provides universal composability properties while
including computational aspects as needed for cryptography. The model is automata based, i.e., proto-
cols are executed by interacting machines, and event-based, i.e., machines react on certain inputs. All
details of the model that are not necessary for understanding are omitted here; for completeness, we give
rigorous definitions of the relevant notions in Appendix A.
2.1 General System Model
A machine is a probabilistic IO automaton (extended finite-state machine) in a slightly refined model
to allow complexity considerations. For these automata Turing-machine realizations are defined, and the
complexity thereof is measured in terms of a common security parameter k, given as the initial work-tape
content of every machine. A structure consists of a set Mˆ of connected machines and a subset S of free
ports, called service ports. Each structure is complemented to a configuration by a set of user machines
U and an adversary machine A. The machines in U connect only to ports in S , whereas A connects
to the remaining free ports S¯ of the structure and may interact with the users. We denote the set of
configurations of a structure (Mˆ , S ) by Conf(Mˆ , S ) and the subset of polynomial-time configurations by
Confpoly(Mˆ , S ).
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The general scheduling model in [57, 20] gives each connection c (from an output port c! to an input
port c?) a buffer, and the machine with the corresponding clock port c⊳! can schedule a message there
when it makes a transition. In real cryptographic systems, network connections are typically scheduled
by A, which usually serves as a master scheduler, but the model allows for specifying other designated
master schedulers as well as local schedulers for specific connections. Scheduling of machines is done
sequentially, so there is exactly one active machine M at any time. If this machine has clock-out ports, it
can select the next message to be scheduled. If that message exists, it is delivered by the buffer and the
unique receiving machine is the next active machine. If M tries to schedule multiple messages, only one
is taken, and if it schedules none or the message does not exist, the special master scheduler is scheduled.
This means that a configuration has a well-defined notion of runs, also called traces or executions.
Formally a run is essentially a sequence of steps, and each step is a tuple of the name of the active machine
in this step and its input, output, and old and new local state. As the underlying state-transition functions
of the individual machines are probabilistic, one can define a probability space on the possible runs by a
canonical construction as for Markov chains, cf. [20] for the precise definition. We call the corresponding
random variable runconf ,k for a configuration conf and the security parameter k. One can restrict a
run r to a machine M or a set of machines Mˆ by retaining only the steps of these machines; this is
called the view of these machines. For a configuration conf , the corresponding random variables over
the probability space of all possible runs are denoted by viewconf ,k(M) and view conf ,k(Mˆ ), respectively.
2.2 Partition Configurations for Defining Information Flow
Structures and configurations in their general form impose no restrictions regarding which user can
connect to which service ports, e.g., users in different configurations might connect to a different subset
of the service ports. For quantifying information flow in a reactive environment, as well as for the mere
1 Here and elsewhere we change some notation of [57, 20] from so-called systems to structures. These systems
contain several possible structures, derived from an intended structure with a trust model. Here we can always
work with individual structures.
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detection of information flow as defined in [10, 9], we need security domains between which we can
analyze the flow of information. It is intuitive to regard the possible protocol participants as security
domains. However, to be independent of the details of the actual user and the adversary machines, we
represent users by the ports they connect to in the considered structure (Mˆ , S ), and the adversary by the
remaining free ports of the structure. This means that we consider a partition Γ = {Si | i ∈ I} of the set
S of service ports, where I is an arbitrary finite index set. We can now designate each user Hi with i ∈ I
by the subset of service ports Si it connects to. For a given structure and a partition of its service ports,
those configurations where each user only connects to its ports of the partition, and where the adversary
connects to the remaining free ports of the structure are called partition configurations. A characteristic of
partition configurations is that the different user machines and the adversary have no direct connections,
because otherwise they could trivially transmit information without relying on the possibilities granted
by the structure. Moreover, a specific fair master scheduler X is added to the configuration because if
the adversary were allowed to schedule the connections to and from the users, it could always achieve
probabilistic information flow, cf. [10, 9] for more details. We denote the set of partition configurations
of a structure (Mˆ , S ) and partition Γ by Conf(Mˆ , S , Γ ) and the subset of polynomial-time ones by
Confpoly(Mˆ , S , Γ ). Finally, we consider the subset of partition configurations where users are only allowed
to perform a certain number of steps. This will allow us to reason about timing aspects of information
flow. We call a partition configuration with index set I a timed partition configuration for a function
ϕ : I → (N→ N∪ {∞}), if the user Hi in this configuration only makes ϕ(i) outputs (as a function of k,
the security parameter). We call the set of these configurations Confϕ(Mˆ , S , Γ ) and the set of polynomial
ones Confϕpoly(Mˆ , S , Γ ).
3 Measuring Probabilistic Information Flow in Reactive Settings
We now define the amount of information that one user is able to transmit to another user via a
particular structure. Using standard terminology, we call these two users the high user and the low user.
The remaining users are referred to as third parties.
Roughly speaking, the idea of quantifying information flow is that we consider different behaviors
of the high user that result in different views of the low users, and measure the distance between these
different views. Finally, we maximize this distance for all possible behaviors of the high user, which gives
the desired measure of the information quantity. The notion hence provides information on how much
two behaviors of the high user might differ in the worst case, given only the view of the low user, and it
hence resembles the similarity relation of [28].
It remains to decide to what extent the third parties might contribute to the information flow. The
most stringent choice is to regard every third party as malicious, i.e., it fully exploits its possibilities to
help the high user to transmit information to the low user. Formally, this means that we quantify over
the behavior of all third parties to maximize the distance, and we speak of the worst-case information
quantity in this scenario. This approach is the one commonly taken in the literature, as it gives an upper
bound on the amount of information flow under worst-case assumptions. Moreover, it is naturally linked
to the notion of non-interference, i.e., absence of information flow, as we will see in Section 5. Based on
this core definition, we introduce several variants and extensions, including more benign behaviors of the
third parties as well as timing aspects.
Definition 1. (Worst-Case Information Quantity) Let (Mˆ , S ) be a structure, let Γ = {Si | i ∈ I} be a
partition on the set S of service ports for a finite set I, and let ||·, ·|| be a distance of user views, i.e., of
probability distributions. Furthermore, let H,L ∈ I be given. Then the worst-case information quantity
Q
||·,·||
(Mˆ ,S ,Γ )
(H,L) that the high user HH is allowed to transmit to HL is defined as
Q
||·,·||
(Mˆ ,S ,Γ )
(H,L) := max
conf
1
,conf
2
∈Conf(Mˆ ,S ,Γ )
||view conf
1
,k(HL), view conf
2
,k(HL)||,
such that conf l is of the form conf l := (Mˆ , S ,Ul,A) with Ul = {H
(l)
H ,HL,X} ∪ {Hi | i ∈ I \ {H,L}} for
an arbitrary adversary A and arbitrary users H
(1)
H ,H
(2)
H ,HL, and Hi for i ∈ I \ {H,L}. The polynomial-
time worst-case information quantity QP
||·,·||
(Mˆ ,S ,Γ )
(H,L) is defined similarly by taking the maximum over
Confpoly(Mˆ , S , Γ ). ✸
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Several extensions of this definition are useful. First, it is often more natural to consider fixed behaviors
for some of the third parties because in real world examples, e.g., when a spy attempts to transmit
information out of a company, it is unlikely that every employee will help the spy to do so. Formally, this
means that we consider fixed user behaviors for a subset J ⊆ I, i.e., we parameterize the information
quantity by a set M := {Hj | j ∈ J }. The remaining users are considered malicious as in the previous
definition. We speak of the generalized information quantity here because we obtain the worst-case
definition as the special case M = ∅.
Definition 2. (Generalized Information Quantity) Consider the preconditions as in Definition 1 and
let M := {Hj | j ∈ J } be given for fixed machines Hj and J ⊆ I. Then the generalized information
quantity Q
||·,·||,M
(Mˆ ,S ,Γ )
(H,L) with respect to M is defined as
Q
||·,·||,M
(Mˆ ,S ,Γ )
(H,L) := max
conf
1
,conf
2
∈Conf(Mˆ ,S ,Γ )
||view conf
1
,k(HL), view conf
2
,k(HL)||,
such that conf l is of the form conf l := (Mˆ , S ,Ul,A) with Ul = {H
(l)
H ,HL,X} ∪ {Hi | i ∈ I \ {H,L}}
for an arbitrary adversary A and arbitrary users H
(1)
H ,H
(2)
H ,HL, and Hi for i ∈ I \ (J ∪ {H,L}), i.e.,
the maximum is only taken over those configurations in which the users Hj for j ∈ J are fixed by the
parameter M. The polynomial-time variant QP
||·,·||,M
(Mˆ ,S ,Γ )
(H,L) is defined as usual. ✸
Timing capabilities of certain users are typically of interest, i.e., to model that a spy should not be
allowed to send data all the time, or only has limited access to his machine. We use timed partition
configurations for this and speak of the timed generalized information quantity.
Definition 3. (Timed Generalized Information Quantity) Consider the preconditions as in Definition 2
and let in addition a function ϕ : I → (N→ N∪ {∞}) be given. Then the timed generalized information
quantity Q
||·,·||,M,ϕ
(Mˆ ,S ,Γ )
(H,L) with respect to M, ϕ is defined as in Definition 2 except that the maximum is
only taken over Confϕ(Mˆ , S , Γ ). The polynomial-time variant QP
||·,·||,M,ϕ
(Mˆ ,S ,Γ )
(H,L) is defined as usual. ✸
4 Preservation of Information Quantities under Simulatability
We now investigate how the information quantity behaves under simulatability, which is the crypto-
graphic notion of secure implementation. For reactive systems, it means that whatever might happen to
users in a real structure (Mˆ1, S ) can also happen to users in an ideal structure (Mˆ2, S ) (with the same
set of service ports to which the same users can connect). Formally, for every set U of polynomial-time
users, and every polynomial-time adversary A1, there exists a polynomial-time adversary A2 such that
the views of the machines in U are computationally indistinguishable when run either with (Mˆ1, S ) or
with (Mˆ2, S ). This is illustrated in Figure 1. Indistinguishability is a well-known cryptographic notion
from [66].
Definition 4. (Computational Indistinguishability) Two families (vark)k∈N and (var
′
k)k∈N of random
variables on common domains Dk are computationally indistinguishable (“≈”) iff for every algorithm Dis
(the distinguisher) that is probabilistic polynomial-time in its first input, we have
|P (Dis(1k, vark) = 1)− P (Dis(1
k, var′k) = 1)| ∈ NEGL,
where NEGL denotes the set of all negligible functions, i.e., g : N → R≥0 ∈ NEGL iff for all positive
polynomials Q, ∃k0∀k ≥ k0 : g(k) ≤ 1/Q(k). ✸
Intuitively, given the security parameter and an element chosen according to either vark or var
′
k, Dis tries
to guess which distribution the element came from.
Definition 5. (Reactive Simulatability) Let structures (Mˆ1, S ) and (Mˆ2, S ) be given. We say that
(Mˆ1, S ) is at least as secure as (Mˆ2, S ), written (Mˆ1, S ) ≥polysec (Mˆ2, S ) if for every configuration conf 1 =
5
A
1
S
M
1
A
2
M
2
S
U U
Fig. 1. Reactive simulatability: The two views of U must be indistinguishable.
(Mˆ1, S ,U ,A1) ∈ Confpoly(Mˆ1, S ), there exists a configuration conf 2 = (Mˆ2, S ,U ,A2) ∈ Confpoly(Mˆ2, S )
such that
view conf
1
(U ) ≈ view conf
2
(U ).
We speak of perfect reactive simulatability, written (Mˆ1, S ) ≥perfsec (Mˆ2, S ), if the above formula holds for all
(also non-polynomially bounded) configurations of the respective structures, and with indistinguishability
replaced by equality. ✸
4.1 Preservation of Information Quantities
The following theorem establishes that the information quantity between two users is essentially un-
changed under reactive simulatability. More precisely, the theorem states that only a negligible additional
quantity of information can be transmitted to the low user when simulatability is applied, provided that
the employed distance respects computational indistinguishability in a natural manner, i.e., two ensem-
bles are indistinguishable if and only if their distance constitutes a negligible function. We call such
distances computational distances. In the case of perfect reactive simulatability, we even show that no
additional information can be sent to the low user for any distance. (Note that reactive simulatabil-
ity is not symmetric, hence we cannot rule out that the user can only transmit less information when
interacting with a real structure rather than when interacting with the ideal structure.)
These are exactly the properties that already allow modular and cryptographically sound proofs on
the abstract level: For instance, an ideal specification that should prohibit the flow of information between
two users has information quantity zero because it allows no communication between these two users by
construction, e.g., the ideal firewall presented in [10] is of this kind. This is typically much easier to prove
than for a cryptographic realization where the restriction on the information flow might be achieved by
cryptographic techniques, e.g., digital signatures in the real implementation of the firewall. The theorem
hence allows for conveniently analyzing the information flow properties of real cryptographic systems
by means of their ideal counterparts, and we can hope that well-established techniques for enforcing
the absence respectively measuring the quantity of information flow based on type checking techniques,
e.g., [64, 30, 55, 63, 59, 60, 67], can be applied to our setting. Moreover, a negligible amount of information
is the best we can hope for in the presence of asymmetric cryptography because a negligible probability
of error there always remains.
Theorem 1. (Preservation of Information Quantity) Let two structures (Mˆi, S ) for i = 1, 2 be given,
let Γ := {Si | i ∈ I} be a partition of S for a finite index set I, and let H,L ∈ I. LetM := {Hj | j ∈ J }
for some J ⊆ I and ϕ : I → (N→ N ∪ {∞}) arbitrary. Then (Mˆ1, S ) ≥perfsec (Mˆ2, S ) implies
Q
||·,·||,M,ϕ
(Mˆ1,S ,Γ )
(H,L) ≤ Q
||·,·||,M,ϕ
(Mˆ2,S ,Γ )
(H,L)
for every distance ||·, ·||. Moreover, (Mˆ1, S ) ≥
poly
sec (Mˆ2, S ) implies
QP
||·,·||c,M,ϕ
(Mˆ1,S ,Γ )
(H,L) ≤ QP
||·,·||c,M,ϕ
(Mˆ2,S ,Γ )
(H,L) + ǫ(k)
for some ǫ ∈ NEGL and every computational distance ||·, ·||c. ✷
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Proof. Let conf 11 = (Mˆ1, S ,U1,A) and conf
1
2 = (Mˆ1, S ,U2,A) be two (polynomial-time) partition con-
figurations in Confϕ(Mˆ1, S , Γ ) with Ul := {H
(l)
H ,HL,X}∪{Hi | i ∈ I \{H,L}} (for arbitrary machines Hi
for i ∈ I \ (J ∪ {H,L})) such that ||(view conf 1
1
,k(HL), view conf 1
2
,k(HL))|| is equal to Q
||·,·||,M,ϕ
(Mˆ1,S ,Γ )
(H,L) or
to QP
||·,·||c,M,ϕ
(Mˆ1,S ,Γ )
(H,L), respectively, in the polynomial case. Owing to (Mˆ1, S ) ≥sec (Mˆ2, S ), (polynomial-
time) configurations conf 21, conf
2
2 ∈ Conf
ϕ(Mˆ2, S ) exist such that view conf 1
1
,k(U1) ≈ view conf 2
1
,k(U1)
and view conf 1
2
,k(U2) ≈ view conf 2
2
,k(U2). Moreover, we obviously have conf
2
1, conf
2
2 ∈ Conf
ϕ′(Mˆ2, S , Γ )
because the users and the set of service ports are unchanged under simulatability, and ϕ = ϕ′ as the
users’ view could otherwise be trivially distinguished in both configurations (the distinguisher waits until
one user stops in one configuration but continues to send messages in the other configuration).
We now restrict the views of U1 and U2 to the user HL in all configurations. This is the function on
the view of both U1 and U2, i.e., a polynomial-time computable function applied to indistinguishable
views, hence we obtain view conf 1
1
,k(HL) ≈ view conf 2
1
,k(HL) and view conf 1
2
,k(HL) ≈ view conf 2
2
,k(HL). In
the following, we abbreviate view conf i
j
,k(HL) by v
i,j
k for the sake of readability. We obtain ||v
1,1
k , v
1,2
k ||
≤ ||v1,1k , v
2,1
k || + ||v
1,2
k , v
2,2
k || + ||v
2,1
k , v
2,2
k || by the triangle inequality. In the case of perfect reactive
simulatability, we have v1,1k = v
2,1
k and v
1,2
k = v
2,2
k for all k, hence ||v
1,1
k , v
1,2
k || ≤ ||v
2,1
k , v
2,2
k ||. As
conf 21, conf
2
2 ∈ Conf
ϕ(Mˆ2, S , Γ ), Definition 3 implies ||v
2,1
k , v
2,2
k || ≤ Q
||·,·||,M,ϕ
(Mˆ2,S ,Γ )
(H,L) for all distances
||·, ·||, which completes the proof of the perfect case. In the computational case of reactive simulatability,
we have ||v1,1k , v
2,1
k ||c ∈ NEGL and ||v
1,2
k , v
2,2
k ||c ∈ NEGL for every computational distance ||·, ·||c. As the
class of negligible functions is closed under addition, ǫ(k) := ||v1,1k , v
2,1
k ||c + ||v
1,2
k , v
2,2
k ||c is a negligible
function again. Now conf 21, conf
2
2 ∈ Conf
ϕ(Mˆ2, S , Γ ) and Definition 3 imply that ||v
2,1
k , v
2,2
k ||c is upper
bounded by QP
||·,·||c,M,ϕ
(Mˆ2,S ,Γ )
(H,L) for any computational distance ||·, ·||c, which completes the proof of the
computational case.
5 Relationship to Probabilistic Non-Interference
In this section, we show that the worst-case information quantity is related in a natural way to the notion
of probabilistic non-interference, i.e., to the absence of probabilistic information flow. More precisely, we
consider the recently proposed definitions of perfect and computational probabilistic non-interference [10]
in reactive systems, and we show that a structure fulfills a non-interference property for particular high
and low users if and only if the worst-case information quantity between these users is zero in the case of
perfect non-interference or bounded by a negligible function in the case of computational non-interference.
5.1 Brief Review of Computational Probabilistic Non-Interference
We first review briefly the notions of perfect and computation non-interference in reactive systems.
Information flow properties such as non-interference consist of two components: a flow policy and a
definition of information flow. Flow policies specify restrictions on the information flow within a system.
Definition 6. (Flow Policy) Let a structure (Mˆ , S ) be given, and let Γ = {Si | i ∈ I} denote a
partition of S for a finite index set I. A flow policy F of the structure (Mˆ , S ) is a graph F = (Γ,❀)
with ❀ ⊆ Γ × Γ . For (Si, Sj) ∈ ❀, we write Si ❀ Sj , and Si 6❀ Sj otherwise. Furthermore we demand
Si ❀ Si for all Si ∈ Γ . ✸
Here Si ❀ Sj intuitively means that information may flow from Si to Sj, whereas Si 6❀ Sj means that it
must not. The relation 6❀ is the non-interference relation of F , i.e., SH 6❀ SL means that no information
must flow from the user connected to the ports SH to the user connected to the ports SL. To capture this
in a way that allows for computational restrictions, error probabilities etc., the notion of probabilistic
non-interference from [10] gives the user HH (connected to SH) a randomly distributed bit b at the start
of the run, and HH should try to transmit this bit to HL (connected to SL). The user HL then outputs a
bit b∗, which is its guess of the bit b. To capture this formally in the model, the specific users have special
ports for receiving the initial bit and for outputting their guess, respectively, and special machines BITH
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and OUTL are added that produce the bit b and consume the bit b
∗. As for partition configurations, the
same specific fair master scheduler X is added to the configuration to prevent from achieving information
flow in a trivial manner. The resulting configurations are called non-interference configurations for SH
and SL. Then the underlying structure (Mˆ , S ) is defined to fulfill the non-interference requirement defined
by flow policy F in the computational sense (written (Mˆ , S ) |=poly F) iff for all H,L with SH 6❀ SL
and all polynomial-time non-interference configurations for SH and SL, the probability of a correct guess
b = b∗ is only negligibly greater than pure guessing. A structure fulfills the requirement in the perfect
sense (written (Mˆ , S ) |=perf F) iff the same holds for all (also non-polynomially bounded) configurations
and the advantage over pure guessing should be zero. We review the rigorous definitions in Appendix A.
5.2 Linking Information Quantity and Non-Interference
We now show that a structure fulfills a non-interference requirement if and only if the worst-case infor-
mation quantity between the respective pairs of users defined by the flow policy is zero or a negligible
function in the security parameter k, respectively.
The left-to-right direction of this statement is closely related to existing results for previous definitions
of non-interference, where it has been proved that non-interference implies that the information quantity
exchanged between the respective users is zero. In a cryptographic scenario, the notion of a negligibly
small information quantity has replaced the total absence of information flow. When considering the
converse direction however, an information quantity of zero was not sufficient to establish the non-
interference property for many existing definitions of non-interference, which often made these properties
too strict for dealing with information flow. For the definition of perfect and computational probabilistic
non-interference in the reactive setting, we can establish this converse direction. This might serve as an
indication that the reactive definition of non-interference is not overly restrictive and might constitute
an important tool for reasoning about absence of information flow in the presence of cryptography.
Theorem 2. (Information Quantity and Non-Interference) Let a structure (Mˆ , S ), a partition Γ =
{Si | i ∈ I} of S for a finite index set I, and a flow policy F = (Γ,❀) of (Mˆ , S ) be given. Then we have
(Mˆ , S ) |=perf F (resp. (Mˆ , S ) |=poly F) iff for all H,L ∈ I with SH 6❀ SL we have Q
||·,·||
(Mˆ ,S ,Γ )
(H,L) = 0
for all distances ||·, ·|| (resp. QP
||·,·||c
(Mˆ ,S ,Γ )
(H,L) ∈ NEGL for all computational distances ||·, ·||c). ✷
Proof. We only prove the more complicated computational case here; the perfect case can be
easily derived from that. We start with the left-to-right direction. Assume for contradiction
that QP
||·,·||c
(Mˆ ,S ,Γ )
(H,L) 6∈ NEGL for some H,L with SH 6❀ SL and some computational dis-
tance ||·, ·||c. This means that there exist two partition configurations conf 1 = (Mˆ , S ,U1,A) and
conf 2 = (Mˆ , S ,U2,A) from Confpoly(Mˆ , S , Γ ) with Ul := {H
(l)
H ,HL,X} ∪ {Hi | i ∈ I \ {H,L}}
such that ||view conf
1
,k(HL), view conf
2
,k(HL)||c = QP
||·,·||c
(Mˆ ,S ,Γ )
(H,L). This implies view conf
1
,k(HL) 6≈
view conf
2
,k(HL), i.e., there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher Dis such that
|P (Dis(1k, view conf
1
,k(HL)) = 1) − P (Dis(1k, view conf
2
,k(HL)) = 1)| = n(k) for a non-negligible func-
tion n. We now define a non-interference configuration conf that contradicts (Mˆ , S ) |=poly F . If the
high user of conf receives b = 0, it acts as H
(1)
H , and as H
(2)
H otherwise. The low user of conf act as
HL but when HL would enter final state, the low user uses Dis as a blackbox submachine, runs it on
HL’s view, and outputs the bit that Dis outputs. The low user is polynomial-time because both HL and
Dis are polynomial-time. The remaining users of conf act as in configuration conf 1 and conf 2. By the
construction of conf , the probability of a correct guess b = b∗ of the low user in conf is equal to n(k),
which yields a contradiction to (Mˆ , S ) |=poly F .
We now prove the right-to-left direction. Assume for contradiction that (Mˆ , S ) 6|=poly F . Then there
exist H,L with SH 6❀ SL and a non-interference configuration conf for SH , SL such that the probability
of a correct guess of the low user in conf is equal to 12 +n(k) for some non-negligible function n. We now
define two partition configurations conf 1, conf 2 as follows. The user H
(1)
H in conf 1 acts as HH would if
it received b = 0, and H
(2)
H in conf 2 acts as HH would if it received b = 1. The user HL in conf 1 and
conf 2 acts as the low user in conf but instead of outputting the bit b
∗ to the now non-existing machine
OUTL, it simply stores b
∗ (to keep it part of its view). The remaining users act as in conf . Now, as n
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is a non-negligible function, we immediately obtain view conf
1
,k(HL) 6≈ viewconf
2
,k(HL) by construction
of conf 1 and conf 2, and hence ||view conf 1,k(HL), view conf 2,k(HL)||c 6∈ NEGL for every computational
distance ||·, ·||c. This yields QP
||·,·||c
(Mˆ ,S ,Γ )
(H,L) ≥ ||view conf
1
,k(HL), view conf
2
,k(HL)||c 6∈ NEGL and hence
the desired contradiction.
The key property proved about the notions of perfect and computation probabilistic non-interference
in [10] is that they are preserved under reactive simulatability, i.e., if (Mˆ2, S ) fulfills a non-interference
requirement and (Mˆ1, S ) is at least as secure as (Mˆ2, S ), then (Mˆ1, S ) also fulfills this non-interference
requirement. Using the results of Theorem 2 and Theorem 1, we can give a very short alternative proof.
Corollary 1. (Preservation of Perfect/Computation Probabilistic Non-interference [10], Sketch) Let
structures (Mˆ1, S ), (Mˆ2, S ) be given such that (Mˆ1, S ) ≥xsec (Mˆ2, S ) for x ∈ {poly, perf}. Then (Mˆ2, S ) |=
x
F for a flow policy F implies (Mˆ1, S ) |=
x F . ✷
Proof. Theorem 2 and (Mˆ2, S ) |=poly F imply QP
||·,·||c
Mˆ2,S ,Γ
(H,L) ∈ NEGL for all H,L with SH 6❀ SL
and all computational distances ||·, ·||c. Theorem 1 implies QP
||·,·||c
Mˆ1,S ,Γ
(H,L) ≤ QP
||·,·||c
Mˆ2,S ,Γ
(H,L)+ ǫ(k) for
some ǫ ∈ NEGL. Hence QP
||·,·||c
Mˆ1,S ,Γ
(H,L) ∈ NEGL because the class of negligible function is closed under
addition. Theorem 2 then yields (Mˆ1, S ) |=poly F . The perfect case is proved by replacing QP with Q
and by considering arbitrary distances.
6 Conclusion
We have presented the first definitions for quantifying information flow within a reactive setting. The
definitions comprise unconditional as well as complexity-theoretic aspects of security and are hence
suited for reasoning about information flow even in the presence of cryptography. We have shown that
our definitions are preserved under simulatability which constitutes the cryptographic notion of a secure
implementation. This significantly simplifies to determine the information flow quantity for cryptographic
system since simulatability helps to eliminate cryptography-related details such as error probabilities and
computational restrictions; hence we can hope to exploit existing non-cryptographic techniques for this
task. We have linked our definitions to existing non-interference definitions by showing that a zero or
negligible quantity of information flow is equivalent to perfect and computational probabilistic non-
interference. With our simulatability preservation theorem, this has in particular allowed for a short,
alternative proof that non-interference properties are preserved under simulatability.
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A The Model of Reactive Simulatability
In this section we give a more comprehensive review of the model of reactive simulatability [57, 20] for
the sake of completeness.
A.1 General System Model
Communication between different machines is done via ports. Inspired by the CSP-notation [36], we
write input and output ports as p? and p!, respectively. The input and output ports in a port set P
are written in(P) and out(P), respectively. Connections are defined by naming convention: port p! sends
messages to p?. To achieve asynchronous timing, a message is not immediately delivered to its recipient,
but is first stored in a special machine p˜ called a buffer, where it waits to be scheduled. This can be done
by the machine with the unique clock-out port p⊳!. To schedule the i-th message of buffer p˜, it outputs
i at p⊳!, see Figure 2. The buffer then delivers the i-th message and removes it from its internal list.
Most buffers are scheduled either by a specific master scheduler or by the adversary, i.e., one of those
has the clock-out port. Ports p! and p?, in contrast to the other four port types occurring at the buffers,
are called simple, and a simple machine has only simple ports and clock-out ports.
Receiving
machine
Sending
machine
Scheduler for
buffer q~
q!
q   !
q?
Buffer q~
q   ?
q↔!
q↔?
1
Fig. 2. Naming of ports around a buffer. Later one can often abstract from the buffer and simply regard q! and
q? as asynchronously connected.
The precise definition of machines is a variant of probabilistic state-transition machines, similar to
probabilistic I/O automata as sketched by Lynch [43]. If a machine is switched, it reads an input tuple
at its input ports and performs its transition function. This yields a new state and an output tuple. A
probabilistic transition function actually describes a finite distribution over the pairs of a new state and
an output tuple. Furthermore, each machine has bounds on the length of considered inputs. This allows
time bounds independent of the environment.
Definition 7. (Machines) A machine (for an alphabet Σ) is a tuple
M = (nameM,PortsM, StatesM, δM, lM, IniM,FinM)
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of a machine name nameM ∈ Σ+, a finite sequence PortsM of ports, a set StatesM ⊆ Σ∗ of states, a
probabilistic state-transition function δM, a length function lM : StatesM → (N∪{∞})|in(PortsM)|, and sets
IniM,FinM ⊆ StatesM of initial and final states. Its input set is IM := (Σ∗)|in(PortsM)|; the i-th element
of an input tuple denotes the input at the i-th in-port. Its output set is OM := (Σ∗)|out(PortsM)|. The
empty word, ǫ, denotes no in- or output at a port. δM maps each pair (s, I) ∈ StatesM × IM to a finite
distribution over StatesM ×OM.
If s ∈ FinM or I = (ǫ, . . . , ǫ), then δM(s, I) = (s, (ǫ, . . . , ǫ)) deterministically. Inputs are ignored
beyond the length bounds, i.e., δM(s, I) = δM(s, I⌈lM(s)) for all I ∈ IM, where (I⌈lM(s))i := Ii⌈lM(s)i for
all i. ✸
In the text, we often write “M” for nameM as well. In the following, the initial states of all machines are
a security parameter k ∈ N in unary representation. In order to define the notion of polynomial runtime
for these machines, Turing machine realizations of them are defined so that the runtime can be measured
in the size of the initial worktape content (typically a security parameter in unary representation).
A collection Cˆ of machines is a finite set of machines with pairwise different machine names and
disjoint sets of ports. All machines start with the same security parameter k. Let furthermore ports(Cˆ )
denote the set of all ports of all machines in Cˆ . The completion [Cˆ ] of a collection Cˆ consists of all
machines of Cˆ and the buffers needed for all the ports in Cˆ . The free ports free(Cˆ ) in a collection are
those to which no other port in the collection connects. A collection Cˆ is closed if its completion [Cˆ ]
has no free ports except a special master clock-in port clk⊳?. The machine with this port is the master
scheduler, to which control returns as a default.
For a closed collection, a probability space of runs (sometimes called traces or executions) is defined.
The machines switch sequentially, i.e., there is exactly one active machine M at any time, called the
current scheduler. If this machine has clock-out ports, it can select the next message to be scheduled as
explained above. If that message exists, it is delivered by the buffer and the recipient is the next active
machine. If M attempts to schedule multiple messages, only one is taken. If it schedules none or the
message does not exist, the master scheduler is activated. Formally, runs are sequences of steps defined
as follows (where the state-transition function of buffers is as explained above).
Definition 8. (Runs) Given a closed collection Cˆ with master scheduler X and a security parameter
k, the probability space of runs is defined inductively by the following algorithm. It has variables r for
the run under construction and MCS for the current scheduler, and treats each port as a variable over
Σ∗. Here, r is an initially empty list, MCS a machine name initialized with X, and all port variables are
initially ǫ except for clk⊳? := 1. Probabilistic choices only occur in Phase 1.
1. Switch current scheduler: Switch machine MCS, i.e., set (s
′, O) ← δMCS(s, I) for its current state s
and in-port values I. Then assign ǫ to all in-ports of MCS.
2. Termination: If X is in a final state, the run stops.
3. Buffer new messages: For each simple out-port q! of MCS, switch buffer q˜ with input q
↔? := q!, cf.
Figure 2. Then assign ǫ to all these ports q! and q↔?.
4. Clean up scheduling: If at least one clock out-port of MCS has a value 6= ǫ, let q
⊳! denote the first
such port and assign ǫ to the others. Otherwise let clk⊳? := 1 and MCS := X and go back to Phase 1.
5. Deliver scheduled message: Switch buffer q˜ with input q⊳? := q⊳! (see Figure 2), set q? := q↔!
and then assign ǫ to all ports of q˜ and to q⊳!. Let MCS := M
′ for the unique machine M′ with
q? ∈ ports(M′). Go back to Phase 1.
Whenever a machine (this may be a buffer) with name nameM is switched from (s, I) to (s
′, O), we
append a step (nameM, s, I
′, s′, O) to the run r for I ′ := I⌈lM(s), except if s is final or I
′ = (ǫ, . . . , ǫ).
This gives a family of random variables
runCˆ = (runCˆ ,k)k∈N.
For a number l ∈ N, the l-step prefix of a run r is the list of the first l steps. ✸
Next we define what a machine sees in a run and what events happen at a set of ports, and the
probabilities of such views and events.
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Definition 9. (Views and Restrictions to Ports) The view of a set of machines Mˆ in a run r is the
subsequence of all steps (nameM, s, I, s
′, O) where nameM is the name of a machine M ∈ Mˆ . The
restriction r⌈S of a run to a set S of ports is a sequence derived as follows: First only retain the inputs
and outputs, (I, O), from each step, and further restrict I and O to the ports in S . Then delete pairs
where both I and O have become empty.
The corresponding families of random variables (in the probability space over the runs) are denoted
by
view Cˆ (Mˆ ) = (view Cˆ ,k(Mˆ ))k∈N and
runCˆ ⌈S= (runCˆ ,k⌈S )k∈N.
With an additional index l, we denote the l(k)-step prefixes of the views and restrictions.
✸
For a one-element set Mˆ = {H} we write view Cˆ (H) for view Cˆ ({H}).
A.2 Security-specific System Model
For security purposes, we have to define how adversaries and honest users connect to specified machines
of a collection. First, an adversary may take over parts of the initially intended machines. These machines
are then absorbed into the adversary, and the remaining machines form a structure. Formally, a structure
is a collection of machines in which one additionally distinguishes which free ports honest users can
connect to and expect some reasonable service (e.g., message transport in a cryptographic firewall), and
which ports are only used by adversaries. The former are the service ports in the following definition.
Valid honest users should neither try to connect to the remaining free ports of a structure, nor, for unique
naming, have ports that already occur inside the structure. This is expressed by forbidden ports. The
ports connecting to a given port set P are expressed by the complement notation Pc, e.g., q!c = q↔?,
q⊳!c = q⊳?, q↔!c = q? in Figure 2, and vice versa.
Definition 10. (Structures) A structure is a pair (Mˆ , S ) where Mˆ is a collection of simple machines
called correct machines, and S ⊆ free([Mˆ ]) is called service ports. If Mˆ is clear from the context, let
S¯ := free([Mˆ ]) \ S . We call forb(Mˆ , S ) := ports(Mˆ ) ∪ S¯ c the forbidden ports. ✸
A structure is completed to a (multi-party) configuration by a set of machines U modeling the honest
users, and by a machine A modeling the adversary. As explained above, the machines in U do not have
certain ports. A connects to the remaining free ports of the structure.
Definition 11. ((Multi-party) Configurations)
a) A (multi-party) configuration of a structure (Mˆ , S ) is a tuple conf = (Mˆ , S ,U ,A), where U is a set
of simple machines without forbidden ports, i.e., ports(U ) ∩ forb(Mˆ , S ) = ∅, and Cˆ := Mˆ ∪U ∪ {A}
is a closed collection. For simplicity, we often write runconf and view conf (Mˆ ) instead of runCˆ and
view Cˆ (Mˆ )
b) The set of (multi-party) configurations is written Conf(Mˆ , S ). The subset of configurations with
polynomial-time users and a polynomial-time adversary is called Confpoly(Mˆ , S ). The index poly is
omitted if it is clear from the context.
✸
Partition and non-interference configurations can now be defined by considering only those users that
have a specific set of ports so that they connect exactly to the ports of the structure prescribed by the
considered partition. We omit the formal yet lengthy definitions and refer to [10].
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Fig. 3. Sketch of the non-interference definition: HL attempts to guess a bit that HH is attempting to transfer.
A.3 Definition of Non-Interference in the Model
We finally give a precise definition of perfect and computational probabilistic non-interference in the
reactive model, i.e., the formal semantics of the 6❀ relation. Usually, expressing this semantics is the
most difficult part of an information-flow definition. Given our underlying model, it is somewhat easier
because we already have definitions of runs, views, and indistinguishability. Based on these definitions,
we can define the probability that the low user correctly guesses the bit that the high user attempts to
transmit.
Definition 12. (Guessing Probability) For a non-interference configuration conf ∈ Conf(Mˆ , S , Γ ) for
SH , SL ∈ Γ of a structure (Mˆ , S ), the guessing probability Pguess,conf is defined as
Pguess,conf := P (b = b
∗ | r ← runconf ,k; b := r⌈pbit!; b
∗ := r⌈p∗
bit
?),
with the ports pbit! and p
∗
bit? defined as in Figure 3. This is a function of the security parameter k.
✸
Now we are ready to give the non-interference definition, i.e., the definition of the semantics of a flow
policy for a reactive setting.
Definition 13. (Non-Interference) Let a structure (Mˆ , S ) ∈ Sys , and a flow policy F = (Γ,❀), Γ =
{Si | i ∈ I} be given. We say that (Mˆ , S ) fulfills the non-interference requirement defined by the flow
policy F
a) perfectly, written (Mˆ , S ) |=perf F , iff for every H,L with SH 6❀ SL and every non-interference
configuration conf ∈ Conf(Mˆ , S , Γ ) for SH and SL, we have
Pguess,conf ≤
1
2
.
c) computationally, written (Mˆ , S ) |=poly F , iff for every H,L with SH 6❀ SL and every polynomial-
time non-interference configuration conf ∈ Confpoly(Mˆ , S , Γ ) for SH and SL there exists a function
ǫ ∈ NEGL such that
Pguess,conf ≤
1
2
+ ǫ(k).
✸
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